Vietnamese Refugees in Hong Kong: Encountering the First to Arrive

 

Introduction

The Author, 1975 The sixth day of May, 1975, was to be like no other day during my long service with the Royal Hong Kong Police Force. Captain Pham Ngoc Luy During the previous fortnight I had been following the final chaotic days of the South Vietnamese nation when the Viet Cong decided on an outright attack on Saigon, and I thought "What a catastrophic turn of events, how did it ever come to this ?" Their recent shellings, atrocities and massacres in the surrounding provinces, disregarding the terms of the 1973 Paris peace agreement as on previous occasions, spelled disaster for Saigon this time. It didn't help either that the American ambassador Graham Martin was reluctant to order an evacuation of his embassy until the situation was hopeless "for fear of spreading panic". He had also been hoping that further negotiations might halt the Viet Cong advance. No such luck and panic to escape their clutches did spread across Saigon, especially when it became known that the President of South Vietnam had himself fled on 27 April leaving a new Vice-President in charge. Ambassador Martin was one of the last Americans to be airlifted from the embassy, just hours before the surrender of the nation by a South Vietnamese General on 30 April, 1975. Another to flee on the day of the surrender was Tran Dinh Truong, the owner and CEO of Vishipco Line, the largest shipping company in South Vietnam, but at least he left instructions to his trusted employees to evacuate as many refugees as they could in the Line's remaining vessels. His company had made him a fortune by re-supplying the American forces with all kinds of cargo needed to pursue the war and so resettlement in the USA must have been a formality. That was his aim as he first headed for Manila with his wife and four children in one of his own vessels and he was later to make another fortune in the USA, not in shipping but in the hotel business, much of it in New York. Truong Xuan One of the freighters he left behind was the m.s. "Truong Xuan" and on 30 April, the day of the surrender, it managed to sail from Saigon with 3,628 refugees crammed on board and just a skeleton crew. However, on reaching the international waters of the South China Sea after sporadic engine failures and once running aground and being hauled off by the brave helmsman of a tugboat, it ran into really serious trouble with water rising in the engine-room because the pumps had stopped working. In the opinion of its captain Pham Ngoc Luy, no amount of manual effort would prevent the vessel from slowly sinking or worse still, capsizing with huge loss of life. So Captain Pham put out a distress signal on 2 May and Captain Anton Olsen of the Danish container ship m.s "Clara Maersk" answered it. He was en route to Hong Kong and luckily for the refugees, without containers which had just been delivered to Bangkok. After three hours pinpointing the stricken ship's exact position (due to the original SOS giving the wrong coordinates) the "Clara Maersk" came alongside. The rescue occurred at 8°54' N 107°02' E. On humanitarian grounds Captain Olsen agreed that everyone on board could be transferred to his vessel and despite the increase in load to twice its normal limit, he was able to guide it in calm seas all the way to Hong Kong, docking there late on 4 May. Captains Olsen and Pham and their crews had undoubtedly saved thousands of lives. Captain Anton Olsen Once the Hong Kong Government had agreed that this first massive number of Vietnamese refugees could stay in Hong Kong until being resettled, they disembarked and were taken to two camps hastily prepared for them in the New Territories and one temporary one in Harcourt Road on Hong Kong Island. Breaking these numbers down, just over 2,000 went to the recently vacated Army camp at Dodwell's Ridge, 1,055 to a camp in Sai Kung and 513 single men were moved from Harcourt Road to Sek Kong Camp when spare barrack accommodation was made ready for them. The most reliable "Clara Maersk" total handled by these first camps, including new births, is one recorded by David Weeks, a former Hong Kong policeman who at extremely short notice became the manager of Dodwell's Ridge Camp. In a letter he sent to Captain Pham in May, 1976, the combined figure was 3,953 and by then all but 35 had been resettled in fourteen democratic countries. That total also represents the highest number of persons ever rescued at sea off one ship. Subsequent Vietnamese "boat people" were not universally so lucky, either at sea or in being resettled quickly and often had to spend many years in Hong Kong's closed camps. Clara Maersk Her Majesty the Queen and the Duke of Edinburgh would have been given the news of the arrival of the "Clara Maersk" by a hard-pressed Governor Sir Murray MacLehose for by a remarkable coincidence they too had arrived in Hong Kong on 4 May at the start of their first Royal Visit. Her Majesty was later thanked by Captain Pham for having helped to expedite the resettlement of this first huge influx of refugees but typically, in her reply, she took no credit for it, merely wishing everyone resettled a happy future in their new countries. One of three babies born at sea was named Chieu Anh and she was to write her very moving life story some forty years later. This can be found on her Chieu Anh - Truong Xuan Baby - Born At Sea.. Predictably her absolute hero is Captain Pham who went on to be the founder of the Vietnam Human Rights Network in the USA in 1994, his actions in rescuing everybody having already been recognised by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). His own hero is Captain Anton Martin Olsen (1921-1996) who was made a Knight of the Order of Danneborg by Queen Margrethe of Denmark for his humane deed. Captain Pham honoured his grave in the Faroe Islands in 2009 and he himself, born in 1920, sails on into his nineties in Virginia. What a remarkable life for an outstanding man who is also the inspiration behind the 2010 production of a magnificent 628-page book entitled "Truong Xuan - Journey to Freedom". As well as its numerous stories and photographs about this momentous journey and the lives of these first fortunate refugees in their new countries, it also fights the corner of millions more displaced South Vietnamese who were not so lucky. Chieu Anh with Captain Pham David Weeks' total of 3,953 probably included 70 who arrived at Dodwell's Ridge Camp from Shaukiwan Police Station late on 6 May and this is where I enter the story as I then happened to be the officer-in-charge of this Sub-Divisional Station in the northeast of Hong Kong Island. At about 0800 hours that morning my Duty Sergeant reported to me that he had just received a message from a local resident saying that a large number of Vietnamese refugees had just gathered in his garden. They had fled Saigon when the Viet Cong entered the city and two fishing boats had brought them to Shaukiwan. "Distressed refugees, what an achievement, must take care of them, extraordinary, get it right"; all these thoughts crossed my mind. Shaukiwan Police Station "Tell the gentleman", I said to the Sergeant, "that we will bring them here for processing and also tell the Barrack Sergeant he is to arrange their transport and set up benches, tables, chairs and a few desks in the shady part of the compound. And also you can warn the kitchen that we will need extra food and water, how much I don't yet know. I'm on my way to see them and the boats." Before leaving the station I broke the news to my Divisional Superintendent John Macdonald and he was to set the wheels in motion to basically treat our police station as a mini Port of Entry for the day, or for as long as it took the Government Security Branch to arrange their next abode. In the garden of a house near the Shaukiwan harbour were 70 outwardly calm but tired Vietnamese and the basics of their journey were described to me. The two fishing boats were shrimp trawlers owned by a joint South Vietnamese/Hong Kong consortium which would explain how their skippers knew their way around the far reaches of Hong Kong harbour. I learnt more on the way to the boats. The owners and crews had been preparing for their escape by sea while the Viet Cong were closing in on Saigon and most of those who managed to do so were their families or friends. But on the way down the Saigon river they had been boarded by a group of about a dozen South Vietnamese military officers taking flight in speed boats which were obviously unable to go far before running out of fuel. These officers were relieved to hear that the trawlers' skippers hoped to reach the safety of Hong Kong and settled down for the journey. This was uneventful until the engine of one of the boats failed and both had to be strapped together. Fuel was transferred from the ailing boat to the other one when needed and in relatively calm seas they were able to reach Hong Kong by the early hours of 6 May. Dodwell Ridge Camp I asked if any of the military officers were still with the main group. "Oh no", I was told, "they said they would take public transport into the centre of Hong Kong and seek asylum at the American Consulate". I later heard that they had indeed jumped on a Public Light Bus (PLB) in the centre of Shaukiwan but I could not confirm anything about their subsequent movements. My supposition was that the Consulate would have quickly had them airlifted to Guam which was to become the main American staging-post for tens of thousands of the early refugees, and a magnet for the opportunistic Hong Kong goldsmiths hoping to buy their gold in exchange for cash. John Macdonald and I then examined the boats. All appeared as expected with fishing boats except for several small arms and some loose ammunition scattered around one of the boats. I was told that they had been jettisoned by the military officers before catching their PLB, and wisely so. I later passed these on to the Force Armourer apart from several heavy cartridges or grenades which the Force Bomb Disposal Officer took away for disposal. As for the actual boats, Hong Kong members of the consortium took responsibility for them and I assume that after repairs and servicing they carried on trawling in the peaceful areas of the South China Sea. It would also have made sense for the Vietnamese fishing families amongst the 70 to have applied for resettlement in Hong Kong. At least 145 of these first thousands of refugees did apply for resettlement in Hong Kong and were accepted. Dodwell Ridge Camp Returning to the police station, I found the processing under way exactly as if the group of 70 had arrived at a normal Port of Entry and this was to carry on for most of 6 May. The Government's Secretary for Security had been advised of the situation and officials from the Immigration, Customs and Excise and Port Health Departments quickly arrived to perform their normal duties. During the afternoon I learnt that after processing them, all 70 were to join those who had been sent to Dodwell's Ridge Camp from the "Clara Maersk" the previous day. During processing, and with the aid of an interpreter, I was able to chat with some of the heads of the families. They were understandably still tired and anxious but also relieved and grateful to be in safe Hong Kong hands. I clearly remember one particular family comprising two parents, nine lovely daughters aged from about ten to twenty years and two of their grandparents. Putting myself in the father's shoes, how much more traumatic could it have been for him to be firstly uprooted from his native land and then to undertake a hazardous journey with such a large family and an uncertain future ahead of them? I took my hat off to him and wished him and his family a good and early resettlement and a bright future, as I did with all of the others as they left Shaukiwan for Dodwell's Ridge Camp that evening. The next day I contacted the Camp manager David Weeks and he told me they were settling in well with all the others and just glad to be in a safe and healthy environment again. Sai Kung Camp In 1976 the Hong Kong Government applied to the UNHCR for more material aid and a faster processing of the remaining refugees at Sai Kung and Sek Kong Camps, Dodwell's Ridge having closed as early as October 1975 and by 1977 all had been resettled, mainly to the USA, Canada, France, Australia, Hong Kong and Denmark. As at 31 May 2000, when the last Hong Kong refugee camp closed in the New Territories, a total of 143,700 from both South and North Vietnam had been resettled in the free world, and over 67,000 repatriated back to Vietnam, the last of them forcibly by the post-colonial SAR Government. These are the bare statistics of a generally very awkward twenty-five year period of Open and Closed camps but what a tremendous job the UNHCR and the Hong Kong Government and its disciplined services managed to do in very difficult circumstances after the comparatively easier task of handling the first huge numbers off the Clara Maersk, not that their resettlement was politically trouble-free either. Nguyen Xuan Diep Thanks to the Internet, many records of this period can be studied, including the experiences of numerous passengers on the ill-fated m.s. MS Truong-Xuan and their subsequent resettlement. One of the luckiest passengers was nine-year-old Debbie Nguyen whose story of her family's eventful journey starting fifty miles outside Saigon was to appear in the book "Truong Xuan - Journey to Freedom" that I have already mentioned. Her family of eight (parents, five daughters and a son) was blessed with enormous slices of good luck along the way, culminating in their quick acceptance for resettlement by Australia. On 20 June,1975 and with few possessions, Debbie's family and other relatives left Sai Kung Camp for Sydney and as of 2016 their extended family has more than tripled in size. The first addition was Margaret, a fifth sister for Debbie who was born just a month after they arrived in Sydney. The press gathered to congratulate her parents, especially her amazing mother who had been heavily pregnant with Margaret on board the "Truong Xuan". The whole family continues to treasure the opportunities and the way of life that have luckily come their way and will always appreciate that they owe their lives and freedom to the skill and humanitarian deeds of two outstanding ships' captains Pham Ngoc Luy and Anton Martin Olsen. Debbie Nguyen is now an accountant, married with three children of her own and when she read in my email that I hoped that my own little story may one day also be published she very generously sent me a copy of the marvellous book "Truong Xuan - Journey to Freedom". It is "The Commemorative Book of the Vietnamese Truong Xuan Boat People" and was 35 years in the making. Inside the cover she has written "Thank you for being part of our life's long journey". I think Sydney is very lucky to have Debbie and her outstanding family in its midst. I will also always remember the gratitude shown to the staff of Shaukiwan Police Station by the group of 70 refugees who, in common with those from the "Clara Maersk", would have suffered many an anxious moment in their quest for freedom. It was a privilege to briefly look after them on 6 May, 1975 and I hope that they went on to prosper in the countries that accepted them.

A Hong Kong Policeman & Cricket by Ian Lacy-Smith

 

Introduction

The Author, 1975 Of the sports and pastimes introduced to Hong Kong by the occupying British Forces in 1841, cricket was to quickly play a very significant role in its social and recreational life which it still does. Apart from the years of Japanese Occupation it has been played there every season and now both Hong Kong and China are two of the 104 countries or territories that are either Full or Associate Members of the International Cricket Council (ICC). As such they are required to conform to the Laws, Regulations and The Spirit of Cricket introduced and upheld by the Marylebone Cricket Club (MCC). The end of Hong Kong as a British colony in 1997 has not affected the development of its cricket at all either, quite the contrary in fact as can be seen online at www.espncricinfo.com This has been largely due to generous funding by the ICC and sponsors for numerous competitions including those for women's cricket. For many years now, in order to be eligible for a national team, a player must either have been born in his or her country or territory or have been resident for a long time. In Hong Kong pre-1997 this spelled the end of UK servicemen and overseas employees on short tours or contracts being selected for the national team. Locally every player just wishing to take part in a League or Cup match also had to be registered with the Hong Kong Cricket Association (HKCA). It was a real bonus to my own career with the Hong Kong/Royal Hong Kong Police Force to find that cricket was so well organised and competitive, something I had grown accustomed to from primary school age right through to arrival in Hong Kong in 1962. And my three decades of police service happily coincided with the growth of tourism when international teams were also keen to play in and enjoy Hong Kong. This was to encourage us keen amateurs to try to raise our game against them, produce something special and ultimately impress and possibly inspire our grandchildren. In my case I was to take the field with many Test and County players in the 1960s, the mere occasions and not their inevitable outcomes being what really mattered, although as an opening bowler on some testing wickets I took a total of ten First Class players' wickets, most of them genuine! During my first two tours of duty from 1962 to 1970, each of three-and-a-half years, the Force Sports Council always supported policemen representing the Colony, either in home fixtures or on overseas tours, and particularly when it came to the Olympics and Police Olympics. These events and tours, including cricket, could take us away from normal duty for up to three weeks but did not affect the balance of our annual local leave entitlement of fourteen days. The rationale behind this was of course the need to keep the Force as fit as possible for its often stressful duties, to provide a well earned, enjoyable and relaxing break, and to show the Force in the best possible light. Cricket in Hong Kong had also played its part in breaking down social and racial barriers after the League started in 1903 and in this respect it was important for the Force to enter a team as soon as possible which it did the following season. When our Police Cricket Club reached its century of League cricket in 2004, I recorded as much of its history as I could lay my hands on and some of the highlights of my work are at Chapter Three. The PCC closed down in 2010 after the last cricketing expatriate officer retired. He had only been able to keep it going after the 1997 handover by enlisting some "Auxiliary policemen" to keep a viable "Police" team in the HKCA Saturday League. This was only tolerated by the Commandant of the Training School (now the Police College) for as long as there was a regular police officer playing on the College ground with these keen young men of Indian sub-continental origin who needed somewhere to play League cricket. For the whole of my service only one local Chinese officer, a constable, played for a police team, and he had only learnt to play by bowling in the nets to members of the Hong Kong CC where his father was the head groundsman.

Chapter One - My Own Background

Soon after the outbreak of war in September 1939 my father's Canada Life Assurance Company branch in London informed all its UK employees that accommodation would be made available for their families in Toronto if they chose to evacuate. Many, including my father who had just escaped from Dunkirk, were to take up the offer and so my mother, sister age five and myself, just a year old, departed from Liverpool docks in July, 1940 as Hitler was preparing to invade England. Two months later Churchill stopped these evacuation voyages to Canada and the USA when the S.S. "City of Benares" was sunk with the loss of 262 passengers and crew, mainly mothers and children. So being ahead of that disaster was my first stroke of luck. The second was the survival of my BEF father, firstly from Dunkirk, then Abyssinia, the Desert and finally Italy with the Eighth Army. Thus fate decreed that we could be reunited as a family at our East Twickenham home in May 1945. My paternal grandparents who lived in East Sheen had kept an eye on our home for the whole of the war apart from a few months when they wisely moved to the comparative safety of Hampshire at the height of the V bomb attacks. My other grandparents in East Ham also survived the Blitz and V bombs and none of the family homes were damaged either, so we were indeed two very lucky families. Age nearly six, and with father not yet demobbed in May 1945, I remember the return train journey from Toronto to Halifax, Nova Scotia, the friendly crew on the S.S. "Ranchi" and the slow, sooty rail journey south from Greenock to London through war-torn Britain, followed by rationing and having to use coupons even as a small boy. My first big treat after the war was being taken to the Oval by my father in August 1947 where we saw Denis Compton score 53 against the South Africans in his record-breaking year. He was my primary school's idol as was Len Hutton in the north of England and we all wanted one of their Stuart Surridge or Gradidge bats. A bigger treat lay in wait for me in May 1948 when Don Bradman's Australians came to Essex. Details of that memorable day, other cricket and how I was accepted for the Hong Kong Police Force in 1962 now follow in Chapter Two.

Chapter Two - Growing Up With Cricket And Early Days In Hong Kong

After the delight of seeing Denis Compton in 1947, I was lucky to witness Don Bradman's Australians score a world record 721 runs in one day at Southchurch Park, Southend the following May 1948. My mother had taken me to see her cousin Molly who was married to the Essex and England leg-spinner T.P.B. "Peter" Smith who after meeting us was mercilessly hit all over the Park, as was rising star Trevor Bailey. Essex were then bowled out twice the next day, a humiliation that England were also to suffer in the imminent "Ashes" series which they lost 4-0, its lowest point being dismissed for 52 at the Oval of which Len Hutton scored 30. So already, at age nine, I was witnessing the highs and lows of cricket which over my playing years just about evened out. One might think it's all going wrong but hold tight and the unexpected can happen, which is all part of the enduring charm of the game. Peter Smith illustrated this when batting at number eleven for Essex against Derbyshire in 1947 he scored an incredible match-winning 163. This still stands as another world record in a first-class match, oddly preceding his part in helping the Australians score their own world record 721 in one day. My usual approach to such events, as with my police career, was not to dwell too long on a disappointing episode but learn from it and do one's best to ensure it doesn't happen again or attempt to quickly put things right. This was also my advice to colleagues when they failed to match the standards I expected of them. The Author, 1963 Anyway, back to my pre-Hong Kong cricket years. With lots of practice bowling with a tennis-ball at stumps chalked on my Twickenham primary school wall and with school friends in the Richmond Old Deer Park close to my home, I was selected for the all-Twickenham primary schools XI in 1949. Then, in my final year at Hampton Grammar School I took a record 56 wickets for the 1st XI in 1957. That led to trials for the Middlesex Grammar Schools XI to play Notts at Trent Bridge but a future Middlesex opening batsman Mike J. Smith blunted my bowling in the final trial and I wasn't selected. But coincidentally, nine years later in Hong Kong, I dismissed another Mike Smith (MJK), captain of the MCC "Ashes" team visiting the Colony on its way home. Between 1958 and 1960 I declined cricket at Leeds University because its season always clashed with exams but after graduation and during my eighteen months as a trainee sales executive I played for a strong Courtaulds team that won both the Coventry Works League and its Cup competition in 1961. However, in early 1962, after Courtaulds were subjected to a takeover bid by ICI I was told my future lay elsewhere. I had been unsure of my prospects with the company anyway and leaving it turned out to be a blessing in disguise. Disciplined police and military service had run in the family for at least a hundred years and I opted for a police career overseas, the Metropolitan Police starting salary for a constable in 1962 being just six pounds a week. Several colonies were still available but I decided to apply for the paramilitary Hong Kong Police Force, spurred on by an old school friend who had only recently joined as a Probationary Inspector and was clearly handling and enjoying both his duties and team sports. Like me he had won Colours for cricket and rugby at Hampton Grammar School and within his first year had already represented the Force at both. This convinced me that I should apply for the same post and after being accepted by a Crown Agents panel noting my five years in the School CCF and Leeds University degree, my squad of eight expatriate officers and eight local officers began its six months training at the Police Training School on Hong Kong Island in September 1962.  HK team v Malaysia 1965 We all hoped to be confirmed as full Inspectors after three years service during which we had to pass more professional examinations including, for the expatriate officers, the first grade of spoken Cantonese at the Government Language School. Once confirmed, our first tour would end six months later and off the expats would go on vacation leave, long enough for some of us to get married in 1966 and, in my case, bring a bride to the Far East on a proverbial "slow boat to China". Travelling with only ten other passengers on a pre-containerisation Glen Lines freighter was an excellent introduction to Port Said, Aden, Penang, Port Swettenham (now Port Klang), Singapore and Manila where at each port except Aden we were allowed ashore, even hiring cars for up to three days while the ship laboriously unloaded and re-loaded cargo in nets. All this was new for my young bride but I had already toured Malaysia and Singapore with the Hong Kong cricket squad of sixteen in May 1965, the highlight of which was the three-day "Interport" match against Malaysia in Kuala Lumpur when I became the first policeman to ever represent the full Hong Kong team which I shall mention again in Chapter Three.

Chapter Three - Highlights Of My History Of The Police Cricket Club And Its Members

Police Recreation Club (PRC) 1904 - Formed from a small number of expatriate police officers relaxing at the Police Recreation Club (PRC), a team was first entered in the Hong Kong Cricket League in the 1904/05 season. Its "pavilion" was a rudimentary mat-shed on ground donated by a neighbouring club on the edge of the Happy Valley Racecourse. Gary Sobers 1940 - Under the captaincy of the Commissioner of Police Thomas Henry King, PRC II won the 2nd Division League championship and again in 1967. Thomas King retired a few months before Japan invaded Hong Kong in December 1941 and so fortunately avoided internment in Stanley Prison. 1948 - Of the 321 expatriate police officers interned in Stanley Prison between 1942 and 1945, only 4 were to play for the PRC again when League cricket resumed three years later. Most of the PRC's fabric, pre-war records and photographs had been destroyed and a new clubhouse was built from Police HQ welfare funds. 1962 - PRC members start to be selected by the HKCA for matches against touring teams. 2 April 1964 - I had the finest cricketing moment of my life when playing for the Commander, British Forces XI against E. W. Swanton's Commonwealth XI at the HKCC, Chater Road at the end of my first full season with the PRC. The great Gary Sobers had despatched my first ball for four but then cut my next lifting ball to the left of the wicket-keeper who took an excellent tumbling catch. To this day, neither I nor the wicket-keeper, another police inspector named Mike Prew, can quite believe this happened. Gary more than made up for this short stay at the crease by scoring 106 in 90 minutes the next day against the full Hong Kong team. The Selangor Club May 1965 - I become the first Hong Kong policeman to be capped for Hong Kong when selected for the 18th three-day "Interport" against Malaysia at the Selangor Club in Kuala Lumpur. I was also fortunate to meet Sir Claude Fenner, the last British Commissioner of the Royal Malaysia Police at the Police Depot when Hong Kong played and beat the Malaysia Forces/Police team in a two-day match. In August 1965 Singapore left the Malaysia Federation and appointed its own local Commissioner as did Malaysia when Sir Claude retired. Sir Claude Fenner 1965 to 1969 - I win three more caps against Singapore and Malaysia and am also privileged to play against County Champions Worcestershire, the MCC (England) team returning from its 1965/66 "Ashes" tour, the Cricket Club of India and an International XI of current and future English Test players. In total, I was on the field with 33 Test and County players and took 10 of their wickets, admittedly being gifted a few. Just bowling at household names of the day such as England stalwarts Colin Cowdrey, Geoff Boycott, Tom Graveney, MJK Smith and Mike Denness, Indians Polly Umrigar and the Nawab of Pataudi, recently retired Australian captain Richie Benaud and of course Gary Sobers are indelible memories. I was only a useful club cricketer but what a unique opportunity Hong Kong offered myself and others in those days. Batting against them (always after the visitors to prolong a match!) was however a question of "How long can I ride my luck? So "Give it a go, man!" My favourite dismissal scorebook entry is "Lacy-Smith caught Benaud bowled Ramadhin 4". After my boundary, two of the greats must have decided it was time for me to go and off I went! Tom Graveney 1964 to 1989 - During these years the PRC (re-named the Police Cricket Club in 1976 when the PRC was demolished in Happy Valley to make way for a flyover and the PCC moved to the Police Training School) became known as "Knock- Out Specialists". We won the premier Rothmans 45 then 50 overs knock-out Cup five times and were runners-up on another six occasions. The most exciting and improbable fighting victory came in the Cup final of 1973 when we were bowled out by the Army for a mediocre 95 on a slow wicket but managed to win by ONE run when their last batsman, going for glory, slashed at a wide ball and was caught by our wicket-keeper Tony Cooper diving to his right. Long celebrations ensued as they also did in 1977 when we won the premier League championship (14 all-day Sunday matches) for the only time in the club's 72- year history. We needed to win the last match against the Kowloon CC but if they won they would be champions - a classic situation. Following our 190 for 9 declared the KCC were going very well at 134 for 2, but then a run-out caused panic and they simply collapsed, losing their last 8 wickets for 14, all out 148 and at last we were champions. Planning the new Police HQ, 1994  Along with my contemporary, captain and fierce competitor Brian Wigley, we really felt it was our moment after trying so hard with other old PCC faithfuls for so long and appropriately Brian and I took eight of the ten wickets that day. Brian was subsequently voted Hong Kong Player of the Year for his all-round achievements that season and went on to manage and train the Hong Kong team for several years. A hard and athletic man, even as a teenager he had played centre and wing for Leicester Tigers before serving the Kenya Police for one tour. 1995 - Brian Wigley and I retired to the UK in senior ranks after each playing for the PCC for about 30 years. Cricket had been the perfect antidote to the pressures of work and we also achieved success with the HKCA that we might not have had anywhere else, as well as experiencing many unforgettable moments. But we could not have had all of that success and enjoyment without our colleagues and so I will devote my final Chapter Four to their own high points and the good times the Police Cricket Club enjoyed locally and on two overseas tours.

Chapter Four - Notable Achievements By Hkp/Rhkp Cricketers And Tours

Hundreds of expatriate police officers played for the HKP and RHKP teams during my service 1962 to 1995 but only a total of eight ever earned treasured "Interport" caps against Malaysia and Singapore. This 37-match series going back to 1890 ended in 1987 but the ICC "Mini World Cup" competitions starting in 1978 and held every four years also counted for a Hong Kong cap. The list of HKP/RHKP "Interporters" and those chosen for the "Mini World Cups" (where the top two or three teams would progress to the World Cup proper - Hong Kong has so far never achieved that distinction) is as follows :- PRC Rothmans Cup, 1973 Interports Ian Lacy-Smith 4 between 1965 and 1969; Kit Cumings 4 between 1968 and 1975; Brian Wigley 1 in 1968; Mike Duggan 5 between 1969 and 1974; Roger Booth 3 between 1972 and 1974; Rod Starling 3 between 1975 and 1981; Nigel Stearns 7 between 1978 and 1987; Glyn Davies 2 in 1983. Mini World Cup Nigel Stearns a total of 21 matches in England 1982, England 1986 and The Netherlands in 1990; Glyn Davies a total of 12 matches in 1986 and 1990 when he was also Hong Kong's captain; Rod Starling 5 matches in 1982; Tarun Sawney 1 match in 1990. Nigel Stearns was the PCC's and Hong Kong's outstanding batsman for many years and holds the record score of 169 in an Interport achieved in the final match against Singapore in 1987. For many years after retirement from the RHKP he was the HKCC General Manager,then he moved to the same position at the Singapore CC. Of the PCC "Interport" bowlers, Ian Lacy-Smith and Kit Cumings each took 11 wickets and were also the most economical. For the most part less competitive but always enjoyable, entertaining visiting tourists was always welcomed once the PCC were able do so on their own at the Police Training School ground. They nearly always brought their wives and girlfriends with them, mainly to enjoy the sights and shopping but everyone was sure of a good day out with us which often included a meal downtown after the cricket. This was also the case when in 1981 and 1983 the PCC toured Singapore, Malaysia and the North Island of New Zealand via Sydney. Our hosts certainly went to great lengths to ensure that we enjoyed everything they had arranged for us or taken us to see and we in turn did our best for every team that visited us, who were as follows:- the Singapore Police in 1966, the Singapore Combined Services in 1968, and in the 1980s and 1990s Hertford CC, Thomas Cook, the Auckland Travellers Association, farmers from Wagga Wagga in New South Wales, the Northern Territory Police from Darwin, the Auckland Police, the Rotorua Police and lastly the Normandy Nomads from Guernsey who had brought along Derek Underwood of 297 Test wickets fame. Readers may be wondering how any of us cricketers found time to police Hong Kong. We did so, very well in fact, and in retirement look back on our careers with great satisfaction and affection where cricket played an integral part. We now keep going as a lively Royal Hong Kong Police Association with over 900 Full and Associate members world wide. I think it is now time to bid farewell from the heart of Somerset and ITS cricket, including watching my two young English grandsons playing for their school and from my armchair, the iPhone videos of my two young Australian grandsons excelling with bat and ball at Sydney Grammar School. The Lacy-Smith cricket story hasn't finished yet

The Sha Tau Kok Incident: Hong Kong 1967 by Guy Shirra (Superintendent Royal Hong Kong Police Force)

 

Sha Tau Kok Police Post

Following the recent 50th Anniversary of the single most serious incident of the whole of the 1967/68 Hong Kong “Disturbances” – “The Sha Tau Kok Incident” – this article seeks to remember the sacrifice of the five Hong Kong Police officers killed, and the eleven others wounded, at the Sha Tau Kok Sino–Hong Kong border village on 8 July 1967.

Introduction

Although I had joined the Hong Kong Police as a nineteen year old after voluntary service in Sarawak on 6 January 1967, I was still under training as a Probationary Inspector when this incident occurred and only heard it live on the force internal security VHF radio net and took no part in the action myself. Hearing the frantic calls for assistance with the sound of machine-gun fire in the background was scary enough. The whole Colony feared that invasion from the North was imminent.

The Incident

This article is the result of personal research encouraged by the post-1997 Hong Kong Police’s 2015 revision of 1967/68 history on their website, removing all reference to communists and militia, and initially substituting the words “unknown gunmen.” Only after a widespread Hong Kong public furore did they later revise it to:

“In the most serious single incident of that year of violence, gunmen opened fire from the Chinese side of the border in Sha Tau Kok (STK). Five policemen were shot dead in a hail of bullets with eleven others injured. The true identity of the gunmen could not be established and there were different versions of them ranging from:

Boundary Stone

(1) ‘communist militia’;
(2) ‘Chinese militia’;
(3) ‘villagers in the border area’;
(4) ‘villagers in the immediate vicinity’; to
(5) ‘unknown gun-men in the Mainland’.”
(HKP January 2016)

Sha Tau Kok Main Police Station

The surviving officers who provided me with written submissions, from the Emergency Unit New Territories (EUNT) inside the police post just 100 m or so from the open border on Chung Ying Street (now demolished), the Police Training Contingent (PTC) D Company who were deployed at the Rural Committee building some 400 m back up Sha Tau Kok Road and Frontier Division had varying opinions as to who was responsible for the deaths and injuries.

I have also had valuable input from the British Army – the Gurkha Rifles and the Intelligence Corps – and, of course, the Internet.

There is also the HKP ballistics report which is indisputable as to the weaponry used to kill and injure the police that day. This is the report dated 11 July 1967 from Norman Hill, Police Ballistics Officer:

“The STK police post bore evidence of having been attacked with stones, bottles, explosives and automatic weapon fire. The items recovered there were: a gelignite anti-personnel bomb, five bullets, five bullet jackets, one piece of lead. The explosive was ‘Sakura’ Gelignite mixed with nails. The rifle bullets were 7.62 mm weighing 122 grains. One of the bullets could be matched to the weapon from which it was fired. The cupro-nickel jackets were of the same caliber. These bullets could have been fired from any of the following weapons or copies thereof: Soviet AK Assault rifle, Soviet SKS carbine or a Soviet RPD LMG. The lump of lead recovered from the wall of the observation tower weighed 71.4 grains and it was assumed had been fired from a shot gun. The holes in the observation tower on the outer and inner walls were all consistent with 7.62 rifle bullets. A line of sight measurement showed that the weapon was fired from the Chinese side of Chung Ying Street, probably from an upper floor or roof of the building. There was a bullet strike on the bottom of the No 3 Weapon Port and blood splashes on the wall and ceiling. There were numerous bullet holes in the outside wall of the STK Clinic facing the police post. Again, they are consistent with 7.62 mm rounds.

Police Post After Attack

There were also numerous holes in the STK Rural Committee Building also consistent with 7.62 mm rounds. The angle of fire in this case was more difficult to assess but could have been from the end of STK Road or from the area of Kong Ha Village. Additionally 10 bullet jackets and 3 bullet cores were recovered from this site. Again, they were the same type as those already mentioned, namely 7.62 mm rifle rounds. At Fanling HQ two Land Rovers were found to have bullet holes in them and a mild steel core from a 7.62 mm rifle round was found. Completely identifiable bullet particles were recovered all having been fired from similar weapons. The conclusion is that at least three different automatic weapons were used as well as the weapon which fired the lead shot.”

Police Post Close-Up

The EUNT, PTC and Frontier Division officers who were there have a varied opinion as to who was responsible, most feeling that it was the work of the Man Bing or Militia, only one feeling that it was the work of the PLA. The official version of events, both by the British and Chinese governments at the time, was that it was hot-headed Militia who were responsible. It was in neither side’s interests to suggest otherwise at the time. One PTC officer, present on the next day, saw a PLA soldier, being relieved by a Militia and hand over his weapon, the implication being that the Militia was in fact himself PLA. Senior PLA officers were observed by the Intelligence Corps prior to the incident studying the area closely and 500 plus PLA were observed moving into the area during the incident.

The general officer commanding 42 Army Group of the PLA in Kwangtung, Huang Yong-sheng, was known to favour the invasion of Hong Kong and belong to the extreme radical Lin Biao faction opposed to the milder Premier Chou En-lai. He commanded all 15,000 PLA and Militia in the HK Border area. Nothing could happen in the area without PLA approval. He was later relieved of his post but later in the decade became Mao’s PLA Chief of Staff in Zhongnanhai. (see The Private Life of Chairman Mao).

Gurkha Band

My personal conclusions as to what happened that day are as follows:

The PLA and Militia decided to ambush the HKP in Sha Tau Kok in revenge for previous incidents in the village when the police suppressed invading mobs with tear gas and baton rounds. These incidents took place on 10th and 24th June and the 6th and 7th of July.

The PLA under General Huang decided to goad the police, and later the Gurkhas, into returning small-arms fire to give them the excuse to invade Hong Kong.

PLA, probably disguised as Militia, crossed the border and set up a light machinegun on Lone Tree Hill above Kong Ha Village to the north and sent other soldiers forward of the village towards the Rural Committee building and at least one sniper to the rear/south east of the police post and fire station. In addition, they set up a machine gun post on their own side of Chung Ying Street with a line of fire onto the Police Post and down the Sha Tau Kok Road.

A large mob of “villagers”, most certainly mostly Militia, at least one armed with a shotgun and others with gelignite fish bombs and an explosive satchel charge, crossed the border and besieged the police post.

PTC then deployed its three platoons outside the Rural Committee building on the Sha Tau Kok Road in order from the front: 10, 12, 11. 10 Platoon then advanced towards the fire station in order to engage the mob.

Firecrackers were then heard, most probably a signal to open fire, and then 11 and 12 Plns were hit by machinegun fire, probably from Lone Tree Hill. Corporal Fung and PC Kong of 12 Platoon were killed and up to eleven other officers injured.

10 Platoon took cover at the fire station but could not gain entry. PC Wong was then killed by the sniper, probably firing from the toilet block to the rear/south east.

One of two attackers attempting to blow a hole in the perimeter fence of the police post was shot dead with an M1 Carbine through a gun port by the senior officer present.

PLA Machine Gun

EUNT in the Police Post then came under sustained and accurate machinegun fire from the PLA post on the other side of Chung Ying Street and PCs Malek and Ahmed were killed.

Two police armoured personnel carriers (APCs) manned by off-duty inspectorate and EUNT Pakistanis came under machinegun fire as they rescued most of the injured from PTC 11 & 12 Plns.

HKP APC

The relieving Gurkhas also came under machinegun fire as they advanced down Sha Tau Kok Road behind the APCs of the Life Guards several hours later, having finally got permission from London to “clear British Territory of armed infiltrators”. One Rifleman received a minor bullet wound but the Gurkhas did not return fire.

The PLA machine-gunned the Gurkhas several times after they had relieved the police along the whole border; at Lo Wu and Man Kam To on 24 August and at Lo Wu on 25 August. Despite being attacked in both locations by invading mobs armed with everything except firearms, including at least 10 Molotov cocktails and 6 fragmentation grenades on 25 August, the Gurkhas never opened fire but relied on white phosphorous and tear gas grenades to defend themselves. A total of 67 WP and 294 TG grenades were used over the two days.

It is to the Gurkhas great credit that they were never tempted to return fire, especially into Chinese Territory. If they had, the PLA would have had all the excuses they needed to cross the border and the history of HK would have changed completely.

Gurkhas

This personal conclusion has only recently been supported by a Militia involved that day and a highly disguised member of the New China News Agency (NCNA), the de facto Chinese Consulate in HK, who were interviewed for a May 2017 iCable News TV documentary on 1967, the latter revealing that “a PLA Platoon Commander” gave orders for the attack.

However, it remains possible that the PLA only opened fire on the police post and the Gurkhas late in the day to allow the Militia to withdraw, which fits with the NCNA revelation above. This is also the view of a senior Frontier Division officer who had access to the investigation files the following year. He remains adamant that the Militia were far more independent and better trained and armed than the Intelligence Corps believed and were responsible for the deaths and injuries that day.

Postscript 1 – 7 July 2017:

“The shooting was done by the regular PLA army, not Militia, already both sides wanted to downplay it as an insignificant border incident. For the last 50 years, all had been saying that it was the fanatic Militia that caused the incident. The PLA responsible for the shooting was 7085 Regiment of the Guangdong Military Region (note the difference between Guangdong military region, which comes under the command of Guangzhou Greater Military Region) responsible for border patrol. The commander was called Li Jingge (团长李经阁) while the war staff was called Ye Tengfang (叶腾芳). Several years ago Ye published a memoir detailing the conflict and revealed that the entire operation was done under Beijing’s instruction. The article was first carried in a Shenzhen journal on history of the city, 【原载深圳政协网-深圳文史第五辑。原标题：20世纪60年代发生在沙头角镇的中英磨擦】

It was later widely quoted on the military website: http://military.china.com/history4/62/20170316/30332953_all.html#page_2" I think by far this article is the most detailed summary of what happened, but it got the British casualties glaringly wrong. It said that 42 Brits were killed; in fact it was only 5.”

Postscript 2 – 7 July 2017:

“There is also a 2nd STK museum which has a private floor devoted to the Militia action on the day. It also claims 42 British deaths and displays the details of 19 Militia who received Merits for their actions, (1 posthumous 1st Class, 5 2nd Class and 12 3rd Class) and the Militia company commander receiving his 1st Class Merit from Mao in Beijing.”

Conclusion

So, I conclude that this was indeed a PLA lead operation but that there was almost certainly major Militia involvement, probably concentrated in the mob attacking the police post.

Certainly, the mobster shot dead (posthumous 1st Class Merit) with the parcel charge was recorded as being Militia: Zhang Tiansheng (張天生) 41yrs 1967-07-08. A militiaman from Mainland China, shot to death by Hong Kong Police at Sha Tau Kok border.

Postscript 3 – 17 May 2018:

5 Murdered Officers

Finally, I was advised to re-read Mao – The Unknown Story by Jung Chang and Jon Halliday which states in Chapter 53 Page 591 that: “Mao’s real line was the one he imparted to Chou En-lai, in secret: “Hong Kong remains the same”. i.e. it stays under British rule. Chou’s assignment was “to stir up enough trouble to provoke reprisals, and then a kowtow, from the British, but not so much violence that it might lead to us having to take back Hong Kong ahead of time” which Chou privately made clear would be disastrous.

In the riots that ensued, Hong Kong police killed some demonstrators; but the number of deaths fell short of a massacre and the colonial authorities refused to apologise.

One Officer Buried

Peking then incited Hong Kong radicals to kill policemen: “Do to them [the police] as they have done to us,” urged the People’s Daily. “Those who kill must pay with their lives.” As the Hong Kong rioters were unable to kill policemen, Chou had to infiltrate soldiers into the Colony. These men slipped across the border on 8 July, dressed in mufti, and shot dead five police. Chou expressed his satisfaction with the results, but vetoed any more such operations in case the situation evolved to a point where Peking’s bluff might be called. (My Italics).

More will no doubt be revealed over time…

Sai Kung Guerillas: The 1942 to 1945 Resistance in Hong Kong By Guy Shirra (Superintendent Royal Hong Kong Police Force)

 

Wong Mo Ying Chapel

The East River Column was a branch of the Guangdong Peoples’ Anti-Japanese Guerrillas originally formed in 1939. The East River Column itself was formed on 2 December 1943 at Lo Fu Mountain north of the Pearl River in a predominantly Hakka dominated area of the province.

East River Column Soldiers

The Hong Kong & Kowloon Independent Brigade was formed on 3 February 1942 at the catholic chapel in Wong Mo Ying village, Sai Kung and became part of the East River Column in December 1943. At its height, the entire Brigade probably comprised up to 1,000 local members.

Sai Kung became the HQ of the Brigade which had other active units in Sha Tau Kok, Yuen Long and Lantau. In addition, there were mostly unarmed intelligence gathering units in Kowloon and Hong Kong and specialist “Iron & Steel” special operations units, “Pistol” assassination units and Marine “Great China” and “Sea Eagle” units operating mostly in eastern waters.

The Brigade was 90% Hakka and the non-Hakka members all learned to speak the dialect. Its members were comprised mostly of young men but included men, women and children of all ages, the latter being employed as couriers and sentinels and dubbed “Little Devils”; they would be at least in their 70s and 80s now.

Sai Kung featured heavily in the resistance. The Brigade radio was moved for security reasons between Cheung Sheung and Chek Keng, both on the present Maclehose Trail, and there was a supply depot at Pak Tam Chung. Sai Kung Market featured the “Day Night Café” which served allied escapees and their guerrilla guardians and Town Island (off the southern tip of High Island) was where the Marine detachment set up a “customs post” to raise revenue for the cause. The Brigade assisted and guided several escaped Allied prisoners of war (POW) on their way to join the British Army Aid Group (BAAG) in Guelin, Gwangxi. Their escape route, mostly from the Sham Shui Po POW camp, was usually west across Lai Chi Kok Bay, via Tsuen Wan, Tai Mo Shan, Kam Tin, Yuen Long to Lok Ma Chau.

Hiram’s Highway

There was an eastern alternative from Ngau Chi Wan village via Custom’s Pass and either Ho Chung and Hebe Haven to Sai Kung or via Delta Pass and Tan Cheung to Sai Kung, probably staying in Sha Kok Mei and Tai Wan villages. The route then continued on via the old Chinese roads to Kei Ling Ha, boat from Che Ha to Plover Cove, Bride’s Pool, Wu Kau Tang, Nam Chung or Chung Mei and boat to Sha Tau Kok.

Other POWs and downed Allied airmen escaped on the old boulder roads via Sha Tin, Tai Wai, Siu Lek Yuen, Ma On Shan and Mau Ping to Sai Kung but mostly because they lost their way in the hills before being discovered and assisted by “the Little Devils”.

There were no western type roads in any of these areas, of course, and the Japanese rarely ventured into the remote New Territories villages which were controlled by the guerrillas throughout the war.

The Japanese commenced building a road with POW and Chinese labour from Kowloon as far as Tseng Lan Shue (now Clear Water Bay Road) but were prevented by the guerrillas from proceeding much further. The British, under Lt. Hiram Potts RM of 3 Commando Brigade Engineers completed the road to Sai Kung (now Hiram’s Highway) in 1945.

Fishing Boat

After the surrender of the Japanese in 1945, the East River Column set up its liaison HQ at 172, Nathan Road, Yaumati, chosen for its proximity to the British Military HQ.

The BAAG S Section with co-opted guerrillas was tasked by the British Military with rounding up the major collaborators with the Japanese and 41 were arrested, tried and mostly hanged for their treachery.

The British Military were also heavily involved with rounding up “Blue Shirt” robbers from China; 60,000 triad gangsters who had grabbed 7,000 firearms from the defeated Japanese, and disarming the 3,000 strong “Gambling House Gang” (employed by the Japanese as “police”) with a 5 million yen bribe.

Sai Kung Guerrillas

Even before the Japanese invasion in 1941, at the request of Chou En Lai, the British permitted the Chinese Communists to open an unofficial liaison office under cover of the Yue Hwa Company in Queen’s Road Central in 1938. The company continued as the Yue Hwa China Products Company after the war and the liaison office became the Xinhua News Agency (NCNA) in Happy Valley in June 1946 (now the Dorsett (sic) Hotel).

The non-Hong Kong members of the East River Column and its HK & K Brigade were mostly repatriated to China (to join the fight against the Nationalists) on 28 September 1945. “Demobilisation Certificates” for those who stayed in Hong Kong were issued in 1946.

On 15 February 1947, the Hong Kong Government made monetary awards and decorations to villages and individuals for their bravery and support for the Allied war effort. The Sai Kung villages were:

Luo Oufeng

Hang Hau

Ta Ho Tun

Sha Kok Mei

Sai Kung Market

Chek Keng

Cheung Sheung

Pak Tam Chung

Ko Tong

Ping Tun

Sham Chung

The other recipients were:

Po Toi O

Shan Liu

Lin Ma Hang

Siu Lek Yuen

Tai Wai

Hok Tau

Shau Kei Wan

Tong Fuk

Chung Mei

Wun Yiu

Banner

Ho Chung was not on the list, possibly because it harboured bandits preying on the populace who were later rounded up and publicly executed there and in Sai Kung Market by the guerrillas. A surprise that Wong Mo Ying was also not listed; possibly it was included with nearby Ping Tun.

Tsam Chuk Wan Memorial

On 12 April 1947, General Sir Neil Ritchie presented banner(s) to the Sai Kung Rural Committee (originally on display in the main hall) and the Sai Kung Chamber of Commerce to commemorate the Sai Kung contribution to the Resistance; photographs show that there were two different banners but I have only been able to locate the one still hanging in the SK RC:

War memorials to their bravery were later completed on 23 January 1989 on Tai Mong Tsai Road near Tsam Chuk Wan where survivors, relatives and officials gather annually in August to repay their respects.

Final Note:

The Committee of the Friends of Sai Kung agreed in late 2010 that it should recognise the contribution of these brave young men and women by attending the next ceremony at Tsam Chuk Wan.

So on another very hot summer’s day on Sunday 14 August 2011, Guy Shirra, Chairman, and Mark Godfrey, Treasurer and resident of Tsam Chuk Wan, both retired members of the Royal Hong Kong Police Force, unofficially represented the society at the ceremony.

Commemoration

Here they were warmly welcomed by the surviving old soldiers, men and women, some of whom were old enough to fight but were mostly former “Little Devil” couriers. They came by the coach load, not only from Sai Kung, but also from Sha Tau Kok, Yuen Long and even Shenzen.

At precisely 11 o’clock, the National Anthem was played and followed by a minute’s silence in honour of the fallen. This was followed by the laying of wreaths by several Sai Kung organisations and individuals.

Guy and Mark were honoured to meet so many fascinating individuals and the very best wishes of the Friends of Sai Kung were offered and warmly accepted.

The survivors and their widows are supported by the Hong Kong Government War Memorial Fund of which CHAN Sui-jeung is a member of its Pension Advisory Committee.

Ex Column and Brigade members in the UK later formed the Gong He Association based in London’s China Town.

Maiwand: Tragedy of Errors by Brigadier (ret'd) P H C Hayward CBE

 

Saving the Guns When I was at Sandhurst, many many moons ago now, the Directing Staff was very keen that I, and my fellow cadets, should learn and understand the Principles of War. Even then it struck me that I was unlikely to have to put them into practice for many years, if at all. Knowledge of them seemed more appropriate to the Commander in Chief of an army than to me, whose only ambition at the time, was to command a platoon in the Regiment of my choice. It seemed to me then, and still does, that it would have been more useful to teach us the Principles of Battle. But a theoretical approach to training was symptomatic of War Office thinking at a time before the Second World War: the Ten Year Rule, enunciated by the politicians, had lulled the Army Council into the belief that the war to end war had achieved its object: Imperial Policing and Duties in Aid of the Civil Power were to be our lot. Yet it was in these little actions all over the Empire that comparatively junior commanders were called upon to deal with situations which were never studied at the Royal Military College. In those days it was India and its North West Frontier that acted as a magnet to our imagination. So when I joined a battalion that had won undying glory and come near to annihilation in the Second Afghan War, I learnt as much as I could about the operations of the South Afghanistan Field Force in 1878 to 1880. I had no access to source materials and could only rely on official histories and the memory of the few survivors whom I chanced to meet. One in particular I remember well, an old man who had been a private soldier in the Regiment and had settled in Egypt, where he was butler and major domo to a retired official of the Indian Civil Service. A recently published and very readable book ("My God - Maiwand!") which has just come into my hands reminds me, not only, of the old man's reminiscences but also reinforces my opinion that the Principles of Battle should have been included in the instruction of potential officers. In the Kandahar campaign every possible mistake was made and Burrows' Brigade was defeated with heavy loss althoug h in ex-private Nunn's opinion "it didn't oughter have happened at all. We'd got them Paythans licked." This article is written with the advantage of hindsight, in comfort and without stress, without any feeling of smug superiority but in all humility to suggest some guide-lines to junior officers who, in the event of nuclear war, may well find themselves cut off from their own formation and commanding a mixed force in the face of a numerically superior enemy. It does not pretend to be a review of Colonel Leigh Maxwell's book, which tells the whole story of the activities of the South Afghanistan Field Force from the start of hostilities until Sir Frederick Roberts' battle of Kandahar put an end to Sirdar Ayoub Khan's pretensions. In order not to disrupt the narrative my observations are confined to an appendix cross-referenced in the text. Brigadier General Burrows consisted of a cavalry Brigade (3rd Sind Horse, 3rd Queen's Own Bombay Light Horse and E Battery of B Brigade RHA) under command of Brigadier General Nuttall, and Burrows' own infantry Brigade (HM 66th Foot less two companies, 1st Bombay Native Infantry (grenadiers), the 30th Bombay Native Infantry (Jacob's Rifles) and a company of the Bombay Sappers and Miners)1. This made up a fighting strength of one thousand eight hundred bayonets five hundred and fifty sabres and six 9-pounder muzzle-loading rifled guns. Its task was to support the army of Wali Sher Ali Khan who was marching against the Sirdar Ayoub Khan, Governor of Herat. The troops left Kandahar on 4 July 1880 and reached the East bank of the Helmand river, eighty miles away, a week later. A few days afterwards, most of Sher Ali Khan's army mutinied and set off Northwards up the West bank, dragging their smooth bore artillery with them. The column commander realised that it was vital to get at the mutineers with the utmost speed but he had encamped in a defensive position where the Helmand River was deep and unfordable. Instead of sacrificing a little time to get his command across the river as a cohesive formation, he committed it to action piecemeal as each squadron could find its way across a difficult ford. Nevertheless, the action was successful, the six guns captured and the infantry put to flight after a bayonet charge by a half company of HM 66th Foot, who had "stormed their . way into a walled garden where they shot or bayoneted the defenders". Perhaps this easy victory made Burrows overconfident. He appears to have overlooked the fact that Jacob's Rifles, largely recruits, had shown strong signs of lack of training and discipline by firing a wild and irregular fusilade without orders at an enemy already far out of shot. This may also have been the reason that, as the mutineers had escaped with their artillery horses, he ordered that some of the captured "ammunition wagons should be burned and that all the ammunition except for fifty-two rounds per gun for each of the six pieces should be thrown into a deep hole in the river . ... No thought appears to have been given to making some use of the fifty camels captured at the same time, nor of loading the infantry with one round a man"2 Burrows was now faced with a difficult decision. He could not stay where he was because the supplies collected in Girishk for his use by the Wali had been spirited away by the mutineers. If he moved North to Haidarabad, where there were said to be ample supplies, he would leave the road to Kandahar open. If he fell back on Kandahar, there would be nothing to stop the Sirdar marching on Kabul. He compromised by withdrawing about half way to base but could not decide where to make his camp. He moved it three times before deciding on a walled enclosure on the Khushk-i-Nakhud river where "he concentrated his one hundred and thirty sick, the stores and the baggage animals".3 He now received the following order: "You will understand that you have full liberty to attack Ayoub if you consider you are strong enough to do so. Government considers it of the greatest political importance that his force should be dispersed and be prevented by all possible means from passing on to Ghazni." Although Burrows had with him an excellent Intelligence organisation of three "political" officers as vvell as two cavalry regiments, whose patrols at troop strength would be safe from any desultory attack, he had no idea of Ayoub Khan's intentions. His patrol plan was faulty: "no permanent outposts were manned: the daily patrols, instead of relieving each other, returned to camp; the same roads were followed, the same times observed". As the country people were hostile they had no difficulty in avoiding the cavalry which brought little or no information into the British camp.4 Moreover he made no use of the heliograph although it was available in Kandahar and was used successfully ~he following year from thence to Maiwand.5 On the evening of 25 July information reached Burrows that the Sirdar had reached Haidarabad and expected to move to Maiwand, fifteen miles away, on the 27th. Burrows did nothing on the 26th except to call an inconclusive council of war. It was not until half past teh at night that he woke his commanding officers with an order to attack Maiwand next morning. 6 Further rest was impossible; the remainder of the night was spent in packing up and in loading the transport animals. The gunners, HM 66th Foot and the cavalry seem to have been fed before dawn, but the Indian infantry got nothing. Even the water bottles, normally filled from wells outside the camp perimeter, were in many cases empty and the sepoys left the camp thirsty to march and fight in the blazing heat of an Afghan summer day.7 Although they had been working since midnight it was not until 7 o'clock that the head of the infantry column left camp, protected from surprise by the cavalry on all sides. HM 66th Foot had been ordered to detach one company as baggage guard and- were finding one officer and forty-two men, who had been hastily trained as gunners, to man the captured smooth bore battery. The two NI Regiments were also detailed to find a company each as baggage guard and were further depleted by having to provide detachments of forty men of the Rifles for the Commissariat, fifty Grenadiers to guard the ordnance stores and a further twenty-five as escort for the Treasury, and General Burrows' personal baggage.8 Only an hour had passed when the first halt had to be called to allow the baggage animals to catch up. This was repeated at Mashak where some officers had breakfast, and men and horses watered. Only the sepoys of the Grenadiers were not allowed to leave their positions to fill their water bottles. Then came information that Afghan horsemen were moving across the column's front and that their cavalry had reached Maiwand. The object of Burrows' sortie had been to cut Ayoub's line of march and prevent him from reaching Ghazni by holding Maiwand. This was now clearly impossible and it seems that his plan was to occupy the village of Mundabad, prepare it for all round defence and lure the Sirdar to attack him there. In the event, possibly due to a misunderstanding of orders, or perhaps in their absence, the cavalry and artillery advanced some one thousand five hundred yards North West of the village across a deep ravine which was later used as a covered approach by the enemy. Shortly afterwards they were joined by the infantry. The baggage and baggage guard was left about two miles back but without any orders.9 Burrows himself came forward and sa~ that his artillery had succeeded in turning the Afghan army from its line of march in order to attack him, but he had not reconnoitred the Mundabad area and had not arranged for anyone else to do so. He decided to stand and fight where he was. The plain to his front appeared flat and featureless. He ignored a cavalry report that there was a ravine two or three hundred yards ahead of him. 10 Meanwhile Ayoub Khan had seen how small was the force before him and decided to surround it with his cavalry and then attack it from all sides at once. The battle began shortly before 11 o'clock when our artillery opened fire on any target that appeared, but with little effect. The heat haze and the dust made accurate observation difficult. "For half an hour the Afghans fired nothing in return, employing the time in closing up the regular infantry and bringing the artillery forward from the rear. The batteries moved up slowly and carefully, making good use of every rise and dip in the ground to conceal their approach, which was masked not only by dust and haze, but also by the journeyings hither and thither of the rest of their army. At a quarter past eleven they were in action, for the most part unseen by the British." It was not until an hour later that Burrows formed his infantry into position. Until then they had been lying down behind the guns. Only the Sappers and Miners had dug themselves in, presumably as only they had the means to do so. At noon Burrows' force was disposed as follows: On the right were four companies of HM 66th facing East with a dry water course in front of them. The Horse Artillery, protected by the Sappers and Miners, prolonged their line Northwards. Behind them one wing of Jacob's Rifles faced North; the other was two hundred yards in their rear. On their left and slightly forward of them were the Grenadiers, also facing North. Slade's smooth bore battery was on their right in front of the Rifles. Left flank protection was provided by a squadron and a troop of the Sind Horse in a dismounted role.11 The first Afghan attack was by the fanatical Ghazis against HM 66th, which met it with controlled fire by companies which halted even these dedicated warriors. Some sought cover and some edged to their left, overlapping the right of the British line. Colonel Galbraith threw back his right company to face this fresh threat but it was clear that a new and more determined attack was being prepared. Harris, the DAQMG got permission from Burrows to move two of the 6 pdrs to strengthen the 66th line. When the Afghans did attack they were "met with a shattering fury of Martini Henry and artillery fire which swept them from their feet and drove them helter skelter back whence they had come". Ayoub now threatened a right hook: two or three thousand horsemen swung round the left of the Grenadiers, who in turn refused their flank. The attack did not develop. At the same time, although there was no immediate threat anywhere, Burrows ordered the rear wing of Jacob's Rifles to send two companies to prolong the line of the 66th Foot on his right and two to do the same for the Grenadiers on the left. He had thus split the Rifles into three parties: one was on each flank and one was left in the centre separated from their comrades by HM 66th and the Grenadiers. Also he had, thus early in the day, committed his only reserve.12 Whilst Burrows was trying to strengthen his line, Ayoub was moving up his artillery and infantry under cover to get into position for the kill. "Burrows knew better than to wait for them to complete their preparations". He ordered the Grenadiers to advance in line for five hundred yards. They had only been on the move for a few minutes when the concealed Afghan artillery opened up from half the distance at which they had previously been in action. In fact the guns were ill-aimed and the casualties few, but, like many other brave men, Burrows was more careful of his soldiers' lives than his own: he ordered the Grenadiers to halt and take cover, thereby losing their momentum and surrendering the initiative to the enemy.13Regular Herati infantry now mounted an attack on them, but the storm of controlled rifle fire and relentless shelling was too much for them. They broke and fled . It was with difficulty that they could be made to re-form and move round the British left flank to support their supine cavalry. Burrows, up in front as usual, saw the threat and ordered the left flank companies of Jacob's Rifles to fall back to fill the gap in his line left by the advance of the Grenadiers. These companies, largely untrained recruits, commanded by Cole, a twenty-one-year-old subaltern who had only been with the Regiment for two months, "started for the rear in such confusion that it was only due to the efforts of the Force Commander that they were stopped and got down into position". 14 The next attack came from the Kabuli infantry regiments, who tried their luck against the main body of the Rifles. They were made of sterner stuff than the Herati's and when they were checked by fire "began to crawl forward in extended order to form up under some unsuspected cover closer to the British Line". Whilst the column was everywhere holding its own, and more, in front. Major Ready, commanding the Baggage Guard, was dealing with loot-hungry Afghans who had worked round his flanks. Detachments of all three infantry regiments cleared the enemy from the Mundabad ravine and occupied the village. Colonel Malcolmson of the Sind Horse, whether on Burrows' orders or not, we do not know, ordered the successful detachments back to their original positions and told Major Ready to retire the leading baggage animals across the ravine. This movement to the rear emboldened the enemy who occupied Mundabad in greater strength than before and caused panic among the camel drivers, many of whom fled with their animals and left the remainder "massed in utter confusion from which it was almost impossible to extricate them". The crisis of the battle came just before one o'clock. The British Force was disposed roughly in a horseshoe formation in an open plain. Around them swarm·ed the Afghan army. To their right rear were the villages of Khig and Mundabad, surrounded by walled gardens, which would have provided a good defensive position and where water was available. Also in the vicinity under cover were a quarter of a million rounds of small arms ammunition and five hundred rounds of shell and case for the 9-pounders of the Horse Artillery. Between this haven of safety and the British battle position was a mile of undefended territory across which ammunition and water must come, but was open to forays by the Afghan horse. 15 Burrows had two alternatives open to him: to risk a withdrawal to Mundabad or to remain where he was in the hope that the Afghan army would attack again and once more be driven off by fire. He chose the latter alternative, probably because he dared not risk moving Cole's companies. What he did not realise was that a deep dry watercourse wound parallel to the British line, in some places only two hundred and fifty yards in front of it, which was now filling with Afghan guns, regular infantry and Ghazis. "Its banks are flush with the plain and its course cannot be traced from the British line even on a clear day". At half-past-one the smooth bore battery ran out of ammunition. Its commander, Slade, having sent officers to the baggage lines to find his reserve of shells without avail "took the extraordinary step of ordering his whole battery to go back and collect it! "The effect of seeing the British guns withdraw was disastrous to the morale of the Indian troops and gave a tremendous boost to that of the enemy. It will be remembered that Burrows had under command a cavalry Brigadier General, Nuttall, and two regiments of horse. Some squadrons had been used in a dismounted role to prolong the left of the horseshoe, some were with the baggage guard and some remained mounted under fire, awaiting orders which did not come. When one squadron commander asked a staff officer to get orders from the Force Commander he was told "that he could withdraw from where he was and go to whichever flank needed him most. He might have expected more specific order". 16 Nuttall saw some Ghazis who had infiltrated round the right flank of HM 66th and ordered, or more probably led, a squadron to charge and disperse them. After a few hundred yards, he changed his mind and ordered their return; he had remembered, or been reminded, that there was a dry water course in his path, deep enough to break up his charge. This abortive charge further raised the enemy morale. Their infantry and cavalry had overlapped both horns of the British fighting line and penetrated between it and the baggage park. Casualties were mounting on both sides, but the Afghans could afford them , the British could not. Moreover their rifles were almost too hot to hold, their ammunition was nearly exhausted and the blazing sun was beating down on men, long since dehydrated from lack of water. Then Ayoub ordered his guns to cease firing and his whole army to charge home. Only HMs 66th could stem this avalanche of fanatics. The two Native Infantry Regiments broke. The gunners, bereft of their infantry support, tried to save their guns but had to abandon two of the 9-pounders. Then the cavalry received orders to charge, but once again Burrows' orders were vague and half the cavalry went one way and half the other. Nuttall appears to have given no orders at all. After a few minutes, during which his manoeuvre had increased the confusion behind the British right, he left the field, with the portion of his regiments which he could collect, in the direction of Mundabad. The 66th Foot, their formation loosened by the sepoys who had fled to find cover behind them, required elbow room. They charged and dispersed the Ghazis to their front but then veered to their right, towards the village of Khig, where they would have some protection behind the walls of the gardens and would be nearer to the Baggage Guard and their own reserve ammunition. They carried with them disorganised elements of both the Rifles and the Grenadiers but were so exhausted after their march and the long fight in blistering heat that "both Europeans and Indians were completely bemused". This state of shock did not last long and they soon rallied to their officers and withdrew in groups firing to such effect that the enemy remained at a respectful distance. Colonel Galbraith got the two rear companies into formation and was joined by other men of the 66th and some of the retreating NI. He made a stand on the East side of the Mundabad Ravine North of Khig whilst those of the 66th who had been worst disorganised by the fleeting NI rallied under Colonel Mainwaring of the Rifles and Beresford-Pierce of the 66th in Mundabad. So the situation at 3 o'clock was that the bulk of the 66th Foot, with some of the NI and some Sappers and Miners, were on the outskirts of Khig, some sepoys retiring cross-country, Mainwaring's party in Mundabad, the Baggage Guard holding its own still further to the South; the cavalry reorganising behind two batteries of artillery were further West, "squadrons coming under the direct command of their own regimental commanders for the first time that day"! The remainder of the artillery was either out of ammunition and retiring or in the hands of the enemy. At this moment Burrows appeared in Mundabad and ordered a bugler to sound the "Retire".17 Last Stand of 66th An extract from Major Ready's report describes the scene from the Baggage Guard: "I now saw numbers of men - mostly sepoys - passing to our rear in twos and threes; some of these men joined the baggage which was then retiring; but the. majority made for the hills, looking, I presume, for water. Captain Quarry's company covered the retreat in skirmishing order and a few of the 1st and 30th Native Infantry, with some other men whom I was able to collect, also formed part of the general line. Captain Slade RHA now called upon us to support him and came into action firing several rounds with excellent effect. The enemy did not maintain a vigorous pursuit. At about 5.30pm their guns ceased firing, and after that I consider that the pursuit ended. " It had indeed, and for two reasons. The first was that practically the whole of the baggage of the Brigade, scattered over the countryside, was an irresistible temptation to the Afghan horse, who concentrated on the loot and left the weary, thirsty infantry to struggle back to Kandahar. The second was the courage and discipline displayed by HM 66th Foot and about forty officers and men of the Bombay Presidency units . Colonel Galbraith had about one hundred and ninety men with the colours at his first stand, but casualties came fast and he withdrew in good order, making two further stands in the gardens. Their desperate resistance held up the whole of Ayoub Khan's left and most of his centre while Burrows' party got clear away. T heir end is best described in the despatch sent by the General Officer Commanding in Kandahar to the Commander in Chief in India: "I have it on authority of a Colonel of Artillery in Ayoub Khan's Army who was present at the time, that a part of the 66tfzRegiment which he estimated at one hundred officers and men, made a most determined stand. They were surrounded by the whole of the Afghan army, and fought on until only eleven men were left, inflicting enormous loss upon the enemy. These eleven men charged out of the garden and died with their faces to the foe, fighting to the death; such was the nature of their charge and the grandeur of their bearing, that, although the whole of the Ghazis were assembled round them, not one dared approach to cut them down. Thus standing in the open, back to back, firing steadily and truly, every shot telling, surrounded by thousands, these eleven officers and men died; and it was not until the last man had been shot down that the Ghazis dared advance upon them. He further adds that the conduct of these men was the admiration of all who witnessed it. From an examination of the ground, from corroborative evidence and from the position in which the bodies were found, I have not the least hesitation in stating that this is true; and I think that His Excellency will agree with me when I say that history does not afford any grander or finer instance of gallantry and devotion to Queen and Country than that displayed by the 66th Regiment on the 27 July 1880."

Observations

1. The chain of command must be such that a Commander is not tempted to command "one down".↩ 2. A commander is never justified in abandoning his means of defence until he has relinquished all hope of further resistance.↩ 3. A commander must finalise his plan before moving his troops.↩ 4. A flexible patrol plan, based on knowledge of the enemy and country must be co-ordinated at the highest level.↩ 5. A commander must be prepared to use every means of communication which he is likely to encounter↩ 6. A commander should consult his arms/services commanders individually, make his plan and issue a warning order as soon as possible.↩ 7. The logistic plan is as important as the tactical one↩ 8. A commander should never break up a unit unless it is absolutely necessary .↩ 9. The positioning of the administrative tail, so that it is protected and can carry out its function, must be kept in mind at all times. The ammunition supply must be controlled.↩ 10. Wellington attributed his success to knowing "what was on the other side of the hill".↩ 11.Only in most exceptional circumstances should a unit be used in a role other than that for which it is trained and equipped.↩ 12. It is vital for a commander to keep a reserve with which to influence the battle. When it has been used, it should be replaced as soon as possible.↩ 13. Hesitation in attack is fatal. Once launched, an attack must be thrust home with determination.↩ 14. Withdrawal in contact is one of the most difficult operations of war. It requires minute control.↩ 15. All round, impenetrable defence is vital in a defensive battle. There must be no gaps through which the enemy can infiltrate without suffering unacceptable casualties.↩ 16. All orders must be clear, concise and definite.↩ 17. Withdrawal is only to be resorted to when a position is untenable.↩